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HONORABLE MENTION – SOCIAL SCIENCES
When describing international relations in the latter part of the 19th and
20th centuries, it must be framed in the context of tumultuous political
disorder. The once great empires of the past are dissolving into individual
states; almost every former European hegemon is reduced in size and
power as the ethnic inhabitants push for the creation and international recognition of their own
nations. These growing pains eventually give way to the modem concept of states following the
ideas of self-determination and national sovereignty, transitioning to a system with new, smaller
states mixed with volatile, ailing empires.
The Ottoman Empire had claims in Europe for more than 500 years before the
subordinate regions initiated the exodus of Ottoman control over the territory in question
(Gewehr 1931:79). The Balkan powers of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro seized a
moment of clear weakness in the Turkish government to stage the First Balkan War. The goal of
the Balkan states was to definitively remove the grasp of the Ottoman Empire from its hold of
the area and to divide the retrieved territory among themselves (Holt and Chilton 1917: 490491). They were not the only states in Europe to whom this issue was salient; Russia had
immense hopes of attaining access to the Black Sea, and therefore pushed them to action, while
the Austro-Hungarian Empire did not want Russia to gain this access or to see a fellow kingdom
dissolve (Thaden 1965: 43, 122; Chilton and Holt 1917: 486). Ultimately, after an eight month
entanglement, the Balkan states had successfully stripped Turkey of nearly all its territorial

claims in Europe. There are a myriad of factors that led four modestly populated states to attack
a former world power, but two key determinants are the critical and swift rise of nationalism in
the peninsular states, and the weaning power and stability of the Turkish government that
spawned the confidence of the belligerents during this transition. Though both contribute to the
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development of the First Balkan War, Turkey's "sick man of Europe" image was the primary
reason for the instigation of aggression, with nationalism allowing the movement to be so
successful and definitive (Kennan 1993:5). As will be discussed, never was there a more
advantageous time for a surge of cooperation within the Balkans, united against Ottoman's long
standing claims over highly contested ethnic territory.
In 1878, through the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin, two of the belligerents, Serbia

and Montenegro, secured their independence from the Ottomans. Thirty years into the future,
Bulgaria would too declare total independence precisely one day before the start of the Bosnian
Crisis. Greece had already transitioned away from Ottoman control in 1832, with the help of
several European powers. The Bosnian Crisis strained relationships between Russia and Austria
Hungary and created further uneasiness in the Balkan Peninsula because of the heavily desired
territorial gains that could be produced by eliminating Ottoman control (Gewehr 1931:85).
Revolts and other troubles within Albania also introduced more tension in the peninsula as it
vied for independence against the new government ofthe Young Turks, who were striving to
assimilate and force "Ottomanization" upon their Balkan charges without success or support
(Gewehr 1931:88).
As indicated, Turkey was losing clout in the region rapidly, and was faced with turmoil
as it struggled to regain stability in the midst of a crumbling structure that was emphasized to the
international community primarily by the Italo-Turkish War and again by the annexation of
Bosnia. The ease with which the Italians obtained their objective spurred the mentioned Balkan
states into forming a quadripartite alliance known as the Balkan League to further pursue their
territorial ambitions in March of 1912. The League was met with resentment from the great
powers due to their interests in maintaining their own alliances the "status quo," but with
adamant disapproval from Austria-Hungary and Germany, primarily because they disapproved
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of the probable disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and were concerned with the "containment
ofRussia" (Thaden 1965:117-122; Blainey 1973:63). Russia's aspirations ofterritorial
advancement lead to its full support and desire for action in the Balkan League, but hesitated at
the notion of Bulgaria controlling the Black Sea. Separate alliances between the participants
were made prior to this, designating the territorial spoils each would receive in the probable
event of a war with Turkey. These treaties further provide a more transparent way to understand
the motivations behind the states' offensive cooperation: Serbia's hope for integration of
Albanian and Macedonian territory, Bulgaria's integration of southern Macedonia, Greece's
desire to unite with Crete, and the Montenegrin's wish for part of Albania. Montenegro, though
not as involved as the others, understood the importance of ridding the Balkans of the Ottoman
presence while it was feasible, and was the first to declare war against the Ottoman Empire.
Each member of the Balkan League had individual aspiration pitted toward the Turks, but could
not achieve them solely by relying on their own capabilities and could not justify engaging in a
total war simply for heavily desired territory.
Mobilization had started just before official declarations of war; Montenegro, growing
impatient, finally declared war on the Ottoman Empire on October 8, 1912, with the rest of the
Balkan League quickly following suit just 10 days later. In an effort to maximize each state's
contribution, each member of the Balkan League focused on a particular aspect of the assault
against Turkey. Bulgaria's armies were focused directly towards the areas ofThrace onward to
"threaten Constantinople," while Serbian and Montenegrin forces were aimed at expelling the
Turks out ofMacedonia (Holt and Chilton 1917:490). Greece's infantry had a reputation for
being rather inept, prompting views that purported "'Ifthere is a war [between Greece and
Turkey] we shall probably see that the only thing Greek officers can do besides talking is to run
away;"' fortunately their navy was not only functional, but assisted in hindering logistical and
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tactical planning, like hampering its methods of sending reinforcements or supplies by sea
(Fotakis, 2005:42; Holt and Chilton 1917:490). Turkish war preparation and execution fared
little better than its disappointing performance in the Italo-Turkish war. It was hampered by the
uprising of the progressive Young Turks, a movement that aspired to resuscitate the Empire, but
failed even to morph into a modernized army despite efforts focused specifically on this.
Massive disorganization and institutional instability guaranteed the dominance ofthe Balkan
League over the once great Ottoman Empire. There were reports of "lack of supplies" and "of an
efficient officer corps," and even more remarkably, a high rate of soldiers with broken noses as
the result of"having held their guns improperly while firing" (Helmreich 1938:204).
After an obvious slant in the fighting favoring the four allies and the pronouncement of
Albanian Independence, negotiations began to emerge at a London peace conference in
December of that year. Any progress through negotiations was halted by a political upheaval in
Turkey; the resilient Young Turks had once again forcibly overthrown the Sultanate and
effectively ended the peace negotiations and armistice, favoring continued resistance against the
Ottoman decline. Eight months after the declarations of war, a more successful round of
consultations led to the Treaty of London, thereby ending the First Balkan War and leaving
Turkey without control over the Aegean Islands, Crete and its former provinces in Europe and,
excluding a small area stretching from Enos to Midia, harboring the Dardanelles and Bosporus
straits (Helmreich 1938: 331). The stipulations ofthe territorial gains immediately caused strife
between the allies; Albania's independence encroached on Serbia's intended territorial gains,
providing relatively little recompense for its wartime effort. Bulgaria was equally provoked by
Greek and Serbian infringements on its pre-war claims to the southern portion of Macedonia.
Serbia adamantly refused to cede any of its gain to Bulgaria, thereby ignoring the Serbo-Bulgar
Treaty from the pre-war alliances, unwilling to lose even more of its previously apportioned land
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(Gewehr 1931: 90). Thus, the stage and temperaments were set for the second ofthe two Balkan
Wars, in which the former allies would succumb to their mutual rivalries in the quest for the
finite amount of contested land in the Balkan Peninsula.
The war was fairly damaging for Turkey, resulting in more than twice the number of
Turkish casualties as those of the Balkan League and the loss of valuable territory in the
peninsula. Turkey had no opportunity to establish a reliable government or to recover before the
outbreak of World War I, naturally straining the state's frailty even more, leading "the Turkish
nation [to be] threatened with extinction by involvement in World War I" (Shaw 1977:396).
Because of the numerous, highly compacted ethnic identities within the region, the war
successfully "unleashed the accumulated hatreds, the inherited revenges of centuries," and the
nature of the revolution prompted an extreme backlash from noncombatants, giving them "the
opportunity of vengeances to every peasant who cherished a grudge against a harsh landlord or a
brutal neighbor" (Kennan 1993:71). The war was brutal for both participants and bystanders,
each suffering "at the hands of armies flushed with victory or embittered by defeat," further
playing into the notion that ethnic wars tend to inflict the most anguish and brutality-based
excesses because of the shared history but divergent nationalistic proclivity (Ford 1915: 33).
The First Balkan War proved the powerful effect that self-determination within an area can have,
even on an empire that has controlled the region for half a millennium. This ideology welcomes
an age of great movements for independence by chronically subordinated peoples at the hands of
the powerful kingdoms, but also of habitual violent clashes over topics of ethnicity and power;
Serbia's indignation and displeasure as a result of the Balkan Wars continued to manifest itself,
steeped in negativity and conflict, for essentially the next century.
The success of the Balkan League was somewhat unexpected and unprecedented. The
events of the war transpired to a clear, resounding defeat for the Ottoman Empire, despite its
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historical military superiority over the small Balkan states. Though countless factors preside in
the formation and initiation of every war, the First Balkan War had two determinants that were
the primary propellants of the military conflict, those being the rise of nationalism, with the new
concept of ethnic identity becoming prominent and initiating aggressive ideas of territorial
expansion, and the very visible diminution of the Ottoman Empire; both are strengthened by
underlying aspects of power transition logic. Each gives significant contributions for grasping
the sentiments and motivations behind the war while extending their logic to the rationale that
inevitably led to war.
Historically, conflict within the Balkan Peninsula has been attributed to racial and ethnic
divides between the various kingdoms of the region; the many revolts and the periods of violent
unrest corroborate this, especially immediately preceding the war, with "the collapse of order in
the Albanian regions" (Pavlowitch 1999:196). The Balkans have never been particularly
pacifistic, viewing war as "a process which includes rape and pillage, devastation and massacre"
and as part of their evolution have endured and internalized numerous past hardships under the
influence ofthe halfmillennia rule ofthe Ottoman Empire (Kennan 1993:108). The various
ethnic groups had always been chaotically assembled under the Turks as one entity, but in the
19th
century slowly began fostering ideas of their unique identities. This determination to revive
h
traditional cultural identities was a prevalent movement in the world throughout this time, with
colonies effectively revolting against Old World empires, taking control of their sovereignty, as
demonstrated by the success of the former Spanish colonies. Nationalism within a state gives the
leaders a viable medium with which to rally and later extract from their societies, making it one of
the residual catalysts to many worldwide conflicts because of how easily it garners the public
support and enthusiasm for the war, especially in states with a more revisionist focus.
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Nationalism in the Balkans can be construed as a very active part of the motivations for
war; it can be seen as the direct reasoning that propelled the actions and cooperation of the
afflicted states. When placed as a nationalistically charged, semi-cohesive group, the Balkan
League effectively morphed into the revisionist states bent on self extension that Schweller
describes (100). Under Schweller's auspices, the Balkan League collectively would fall under
what he describes as "wolves," states that seek "to maximize, or significantly increase their
power" (100). Typically states that are identified as wolves seek dramatic systemic changes,
but the Balkan's were solely focused on regional goals. In this instance however, they would
still be considered as "wolves" because of their desire to expand and their dissatisfaction with
the status quo. Fortunately for the Balkan League, the power of the Ottoman Empire was
astoundingly diminished, allowing them to follow their nationalistic zeal with reckless
ambition, fighting "with a fire and frenzy" as would be expected from "hereditary enemies"
(Ford 1915: 33). If, however, the Ottoman Empire had been ofthe same quality of its past, the
grip of self determination would still have led to the intense desire to eject Turkey, but would
have blocked the potential of the Balkans and been in the slightly less aggressive "jackal"
category (100). The strong pull of nationalism allowed them to produce a much more substantial
force than Turkey, for they were fighting for their liberty, giving them the edge to be in the
"wolf' category. Though not akin to Hitler's or Napoleon's level of revisionism, they initiated
a war with the knowledge that the powers could intervene on behalf of Turkey, thereby making
their newly found nationalistic fervor a contributing factor to their ultimate downfall, but they
believed in their mission enough to risk their existence as free states. They were not particularly
risk adverse in the prewar negotiations because of Russia's predicated support, and the absence
of reliable warnings from other powers.
The League was able to expand and become formidable during the development of the
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conflict because of an essential power vacuum created by the influence of Russia and the lack of
credible threats from the other European powers. The Balkan's ideology of racial justice and its
hopes for Balkan reform were met with warnings about the consequences of disturbing the status
quo, yet the new confidence and determination for their quest spurred the continuation of the
objective (Blainey 1973: 63). The fact that the Balkan League essentially ignored warnings from
the top powers to refrain from war shows the unreliability of threats at the time, due to complex
webs of interconnectivity between those powers that bound them from following through with
their demands. The issue clearly was not dire enough for them to risk their alliances or assets
over; they "were really more interested in avoiding a war among themselves than a localized war
in the Balkans" (Thaden 1965:130).
Although the powers were not effective in their threats during the prewar lead up, they
did articulate their resolve when they summoned the rivals to London for the first round of
mediation; which is when the Balkan League realized the potential consequences of provoking
much more stringent European authorities that easily could dominate their forces and threaten
their overall sovereignty (Pavlowitch 1999:198). At this point the League became aware oftheir
mortality and the relative insecurity of their position in the system, reverting away from their
original "uninhibited fear of loss" when solely facing the overextended Ottoman Empire
(Schweller 1994:104). The foundation of all of the confidence and thereby the drive of every
action or inaction was the original sense of bonding over their Slavic past, to preserve their
peninsula from outside powers. The Empire had already proved that it would not stand up
against Austria-Hungary after it annexed Bosnia, and the other Balkan powers balked at the idea
"that Austria-Hungary would try to get a European mandate to occupy Macedonia," thinking in
terms of preservation of their relative power in the peninsula, and of the protection of their
fellow Slavs (Pavlowitch 1999: 196). Nationalism burned in the motivations for numerous

OSWALD AWARDS

HONORABLE MENTION – SOCIAL SCIENCES
atrocities committed before and during the war, and served as reassurance to the League's cause.
During the prewar era, ideologies were provoked, leading to subsequent declarations of
independence from the Ottoman Empire. At the time of the war Austria-Hungary had recently
annexed Bosnia, Bulgaria had just gained full sovereignty, Albania was vying for its own
independence, and looming above all was the "the struggle over Macedonia" (Jelavich 1986:
208). Each of the Balkan states wished for this area's incorporation because they all felt they
had requisition to the intensely diverse population, claiming it for their own nationality. All felt
that the expulsion of the Turks from the prized area would be an ideal step in boosting and
protecting their relative power, especially with the Austrian-Hungarian annexation so freshly
engrained in their memory, the idea seemed like a credible move towards greater autonomy from
the powers outside the peninsula. This accumulated to a great feeling of Pan-Slavism around the
peninsula that had loosely existed since Serbian independence. Once a movement of this nature
has the proper momentum urging it forward, it is with great difficulty that it does not mature into
a legitimate conflict. When negotiations for reform with Turkey ended and the Balkan League
was created there was a great push to finally rid the peninsula of the decaying power and reclaim
the ethnically charged territory under Ottoman control. Nationalism acted as a catalyst for each
decision that led to the outbreak of war. With clear aims, nationalistic self assurance, and hopes
for reciprocity from atrocities committed, the Balkan League was determined to expel Turkey
from the peninsula because the "sympathy, indignation, and horror conspired with nationalistic
aspirations and territorial interests to arouse the kindred populations of the surrounding states"
(Schurman 1914:33-34). The effect of extreme forms of nationalism would be revealed later as
the German Yolk began to develop, but that is just another example of the willingness to commit
to certain causes that states and their people can be drawn to if it is framed in the context of
ethnic and racial conflict or cultural territory.
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A well known observation of the time was of the pronounced weakness of the Ottoman
Empire, which was so engrained in the cause and nature of the First Balkan War. In every
regard, the instability and decay of the Empire was evident, from the disappointing performance
in the Italo-Turkish War to its government's inability to impede further disintegration of their
domain. This common knowledge of the internal vulnerability Turkey faced is the most
significant factor behind the causation of the First Balkan War. With the rise and splendor of
every great empire there is an equally long period of decline, particularly with the "many nations
[that] nibbled on her territory and influence," and eventually the former imperial Turkey,
shadowing a supernova, imploded on itself (Blainey 1973:185).
Blainey's "death-watch war" theory can clarify why the apparent weakness of the
Ottomans was such a significant contribution to the war (69). This was not necessarily a matter
of succession, but rather a myriad of factors that lead the international community's opinion of
Turkey to be similarly unfavorable as if a weak monarch had ascended to power, thus "tilting the
scales of international power" to ultimately favor the revisionist minded Balkans (Blainey 1973:
69). In a typical war of succession, the new ruler has the potential of being a target to
expansionist states because of their inherent frailty due to young age, loss of allies, or other
marked disadvantages (Blainey 1973:69). The same weakness is translated to the Ottoman's
seemingly ever changing government, because it provides that exact level of instability, or
opportunity from the Balkan standpoint. Blainey also describes how "civil unrest, like the death
of kings, marked the crumbling of established authority and therefore affected perceptions of
national power" (70). One static aspect of the Balkans is civil unrest, there seems to have been
perennial clashes over ethnicity, religion, or territory, and in some altercations all three, just
months before the war; revolutionist Turks "killed or wounded several hundred Macedonians"
with bomb in a marketplace (Thaden 1965:104). Albania feared annexation or being split among
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the surrounding countries, while in Macedonia a movement began decreeing that "Slavs in
Macedonia were neither Bulgars nor Serbs" (Jelavich 1986:210).
There is a connection that this war was established on the grounds of Blainey's
"scapegoat" theory because of the abundance of civil strife. However, civil strife seems to be a
near constant in the peninsula, not just an isolated incident during this time frame, so this can be
construed as a lesser contributor to the overall progression to the war. Lastly, according to the
theories of power transition, the Balkans were fortunate enough to be changing in ways that gave
them the confidence and prediction of comparatively inexpensive conflict that they needed to
propel their aggression. They were more expansionist oriented because of their propensity for a
redistribution of power in the region, which was manifested in their actions to unify against the
common threat. Fortunately for them this transition of power was predicated by the certainty of
Russia's support. While the Ottomans wished to maintain the status quo, thus preventing further
damage to their kingdom, the Balkans managed to construct a league in preparation for
aggression because of the ease of with which they foresaw defeating Turkey and for their desire
to share in the implementation and creation of the current political order. Because of their
dominance in the situation, they exhibited "less fear of reprisal" because the Empire's
disintegrated state indicated that they would be "less able to retaliate later" (Evera 1999:123).
Having established Turkey's reputation as a failing state, it is important to examine why
the former Empire was in such a vulnerable position whilst other empires like Austria-Hungary
were completely stable. Turkey was amidst the political fallout from the Young Turk revolution
of 1908 and countercoup that followed, which cast an ominous shadow over Balkan unity
because of the Young Turk's attempted "curtailment ofthe activities of Slavic and Greek
nationalists" (Thaden 1965:62). With each change in authority there was a new system of
government; the Young Turks sought to reestablish the Constitution of 1876 and the removal of
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the Sultan Abdul Hamid, though they failed to achieve the latter until after the countercoup. The
proclamation of Bulgarian independence and Bosnia's annexation were very detrimental to the
Young Turk movement; the losses of those two European territories gave momentum to their
opponents who staged the counterrevolution (Jelavich 1986:215). The political uncertainty of
the time visibly displayed the overstretched Empire's weakness, especially when this coincided
with losing a large track ofland to Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary's overt encroachment. This
substantive amount of governmental inadequacy was also compounded with the ongoing war
against Italy in Libya, which was not faring well for the Empire.
In the midst of the political turmoil, the Empire was seemingly casting around for any

opportunity for reprieve and resurrection of their nation, even imposing an ill-advised boycott on
Greece, hoping for it to definitively "renounce Crete;" this two year boycott on commerce hurt
namely Ottoman Greeks, but severely hurt the Muslims whose livelihood was tied to shipping,
further indicating the magnitude of their political misguidance (Gewehr 1931:88). For having
very little clout in the international system, Turkey was involved in dense web of interactions
with other states, but none were willing to intervene on its behalf. This lack of alliances made
the Ottoman Empire an even more prominent target for the Balkans, and when the powers did
become involved it was solely to prevent each other from gaining an unfair advantage, not to
lessen the demise of the Empire. Furthermore, as the Empire was dissolving it attempted to try
more methods of assimilation through its territories to no avail; the only thing this promoted was
more resentment from the expansionists in the Balkans. The transitional nature of the Turkish
government, the blatant military and organizational weaknesses highlighted by the Italo-Turkish
War, the civil strife within the occupied territory and Turkey's renowned reputation as the "sick
man of Europe" gave an unprecedented opportunity to the Balkan states to expel Turkey and
reap the many benefits (Keneen 1993:5). These components accumulate to portray Turkey, not
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as a sick man, but as a man near death, again giving the Balkans the chance to seize the many
advantageous of ousting the Ottoman Empire. Despite attempting to appear formidable, every
aspect of the Turkish plight relayed its faltering stance to the international system, and for the
Balkans, the multitude of weaknesses amplified their potential of winning and therefore served
as more motivation to take an aggressive stance on Ottoman expulsion.
In light of the evidentiary support ofboth primary causes of the First Balkan War, the

latter does seem to provide a more tangible conception of what led the Balkan states to war
against Turkey. This does not diminish the immense role nationalism played, but it was more a
tributary that aided in the overall scheme of the prewar lead up. The nationalistic vein isn't
completely able to support itself; it derives its legitimacy from the influence of Turkey's weak
image and power transition that was taking place. The justification for the cooperation between
the Balkan League came in part from nationalistic ideals, but namely because each of the actors
had something to gain from Turkey's exodus. The absolute dissolution of the Balkan League
and beginning of the Second Balkan War proves the lack of a true feeling ofPan-Slavism that
trumped all individual state aspirations. The League's main purpose was as "a vehicle for the
attainment of the antagonistic aims of its members" (Gewehr 1931:121). The regions are very
ethnically divergent, so a true sense of overwhelming nationalism emanating from Macedonia
and the rest of the Balkans would be a true feat of cooperation, but with individual incentives
involved the mystery of the ease of the cooperation became more transparent. Nationalism
helped push the powers to exploit the Empire's weaknesses and may have been the ideological
reason, but the casus belli spawned from the extreme transition of power that had slowly
occurred, whether "due to inefficiency and corruption in government or the injection by the
Young Turk part of politics" (Schurman 1914:56).
Seldom can the cause of a war be whittled down to one motivator or catalyst, but is rather
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a mass of smaller occurrences that cumulate into a broad, multi-faceted impetus for the initiation
of force. In this war, after all the parsimonious aspects meld together, the overall cause was the
potential for great Balkan gains and success because of the Ottoman Empire's drastically feeble
state, with issues ofnationalism, the support ofRussia, the recent Halo-Turkish War, and the
noncommittal attitudes of other European powers which fed the Balkan quest for the removal of
Turkey. The opportunity for the Balkans was in fact too great to ignore, because each had
ambitions that could be realized by exploiting Turkey's adulterated state; nationalist zeal played
into an already forming plan. The hope of ridding Turkey from the Balkan Peninsula was
considered a true benefit for the belligerents because of the added security, territorial gains, and
secondarily, as a matter of cultural preservation, but" the success of the Italians in gaining their
ends by war upon Turkey, and the success of the Albanians in gaining their longed-for reforms
by continued insurrection" was the paramount inspiration the Balkan's decision to exploit the
resplendent opportunity of Ottoman weakness, and thus the singular most significant cause of the
First Balkan War (Holt and Chilton 1917:486).
Winston Churchill mused that "the Balkan states produce more history than they can
consume," while Otto von Bismark quipped that "if there is ever another war in Europe, it will
come out of some damned silly thing in the Balkans." These two exemplary quotes illuminate
the context of the strife that has typically been associated with the Balkan Peninsula, both by
men that need no introduction in the political realm. The events that lead to the rise of the First
Balkan War were interconnected and exacerbated each other, making a linear, cause-and-effect
progression difficult to follow. There were many actors vying for their own interests to parse out
a simple account of what happened prior and during the war. All that can be determined is that a
mixture of outside influences from Austria-Hungary and Russia, a feverish spread of
independence in the region in the years prior and in Albania during the conflict, as well as the
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Macedonian territory at stake, pushed the Balkan League into seizing the chance to cast the
peninsula free from Ottoman control during its era of weakness.
Turkey had been declining for some time, but with the Italo-Turkish War and the
annexation of Bosnia, its inability to protect its interests was broadcast to the world. This
spurred a movement within the Balkans to capitalize on this opportunity and exploit Turkey into
ceding its European territory to the victors. Many factors contributed to the creation and
outcome of this movement, especially the prevalence of nationalism from the different Slavic
ethnic groups, but ultimately this translated into the momentum of the already forming scheme
against "a Turkey tom by internal crisis" in the hopes of a satisfying Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek,
and Montenegrin '"historical goals"' (Thaden 1965: 57, 110).
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